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ABSTRACT: Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H* of a theory H, is defended against the
view that H* reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinality of the domain of H, a view which arises
from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam’s theses are examined and shown to
support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter
into the formulation of H* and hence be shown to be finitely axiomatisable; this is done in the Appendix,
which is the most important part of the paper.
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1. Difficulties facing Realism
Structural Scientific Realism —henceforth referred to as SSR— is an epistemological
position whose origins go back to the philosophical insights of Pierre Duhem, Henri
Poincaré and Bertrand Russell. SSR flows from two basic theses.
[a] First, consider the characterisation of Realism as the belief in the existence of a
mind-independent reality. This definition is unsatisfactory because it presupposes a
schism between the mind on the one hand, and that which it tries to grasp on the
other. By metaphysical realism, I shall understand the thesis that there exists a struc-
tured and undivided reality of which the mind is part; moreover, that far from impos-
ing their own order on things, our mental operations are in their turn governed by the
fixed laws which describe the workings of Nature. Hence our brain, or conscious ac-
tivity, evolves according to the very laws it sets out to capture. As shown by Planck
and Popper, this thesis entails that a total explanation of everything in the universe can
never be achieved by the human mind: on pain of vicious circularity, the brain is in
principle incapable of predicting its own future states. Far from being incompatible
with metaphysical realism, this negative result could be regarded as one of its welcome
consequences. [M. Planck 1965b. Also K.R. Popper 1982, Chapter 3].
Methodological realism consists of the further assumption that the structure of re-
ality is, at least in part, intelligible to the mind. It is therefore reasonable for scientists
to aim at grasping that reality. They may of course choose not to do so and content
themselves with constructing phenomenological laws.
Henceforth referred to as SR, scientific realism adds the thesis that successful
theories, i.e. those unified systems which explain the data without ad hoc assumptions,
are approximately true. That is: such systems reflect, in one way or another, the order
of things as they are in themselves; successful hypotheses thus model, and in some
Elie G. ZAHAR6
sense ‘correspond’ to the real structure of the world. Note that SR is committed nei-
ther to the correspondence nor even to Tarski’s semantic theory of truth. There is no
reason why the way in which a hypothesis mirrors reality should be the usual term-by-
term mapping described by traditional semantics. The structure of a scientific system
can be held to reflect reality without each component of the system necessarily refer-
ring to a separate item of that reality. This is in effect the structural-realist stance
which we have denoted by SSR. In its defence, we can say that our usual semantics is
inspired by a common-sense ontology which posits discrete intentional objects. But
such an ontology is not necessarily that of the external world; for common-sense tends
to assimilate the transcendent to the intentional sphere, and hence posit well-
circumscribed entities subsumed by various predicates. This need not however be the
way Nature in which operates. External objects are known exclusively by description,
i.e. through the mediation of a network of theories. So we cannot directly ascertain
what kind of correspondence might obtain between our successful hypotheses and the
transcendent world. Only idealists like Berkeley and Husserl felt certain about the na-
ture of such a correspondence, for idealism postulates only immanent entities. By con-
trast, the way in which realist theories latch on to the world constitutes a problem for
which there exist only conjectural solutions. Thus SR should not be made to stand
and fall with any specific theory of truth; all it asserts is that highly corroborated theo-
ries reflect the ontological order in a way which scientists may —or may not— choose
to specify. There is no reason why realists should not adopt a fallibilist attitude as re-
gards both the truth-value and the mode of reference of their conjectures. Note that
Duhem aptly compared scientific concepts to the flat pieces of the armour which
never exactly fits a knight’s body. These concepts have a metaphorical rather than a
strictly referential function. Poincaré’s rider should nonetheless never be forgotten:
the meanings and referents of the observational terms must be fixed in advance.
Regarding the three positions outlined above, let us note that each is stronger than
the one preceding it.
[b] There is secondly the realisation that we are in principle unable to ascertain the
truth-values of ‘objective’ relations, i.e. of predicates connecting terms some of which
refer to transcendent entities; for of these we have no knowledge by acquaintance,
which is the only kind of knowledge enabling us effectively to decide whether these
entities possess given properties or bear to one another certain relations. The only
knowledge of these objects that we might conceivably attain is through a nexus of
conjectures which, if consistent and empirically well-supported, provides a so called
‘system of implicit definitions’ of its domain of discourse. In other words, our con-
jectures delimit classes of models only one of which might be the real world.
2. The Ramsey-sentence
A physical theory S is usually presented as the consequence class of finitely many
(proper) axioms. The conjunction of the latter can therefore be written as a single
formula G( Q1, … , Qn, T1, … , Tm ), where the Qi ’s denote the observational, and the
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Tj ’s the theoretical predicates of S. (Q and T will be written for the two sequences Q1,
… , Qn  and T1, … , Tm  respectively). Only in the case of the predicates Qi ’s do we
have a direct access to the referents of their arguments and are thus in a position to
decide whether these referents are actually subsumed by the Qi ’s. As for the Tj ’s, all
we can legitimately claim to know about them is that they bear to each other and to
the ‘observables’ Q the second-order relation G(Q, T). According to SSR, the maxi-
mum amount of scientific knowledge we can legitimately lay claim to is encapsulated
by the so-called Ramsey sentence of G(Q, T), i.e. by ($t) G(Q, t); where t stands for
the m-tuple (t1, … , tm ), and ($t) for ($t1, … , tm ).
Prima facie, this conclusion seems highly counter-intuitive. For example: according
to classical science, physical reality consists of impenetrable atoms; where these ulti-
mate constituents of the observable universe were held to be bits of matter possessing
mass and electric charge. One had in mind a concrete picture of mass and charge den-
sities represented by two functions m(x, t ) and r(x, t ), and of a velocity field V =
(v1(x, t ), v2(x, t ), v3(x, t )); where t denotes the time, and x the spatial coordinates. The
quantity r(x, t ) is however clearly apprehended only by description, i.e. by means of
some theoretical predicate R(x, t, r ), where: r represents the function r(x, t ) and
("x )("t )( $!r ) R(x, t, r ) is a consequence of our system. R must therefore be defined
in terms of, or else figure among T1, … , Tm. Hence everything we might claim to
know about the charge, mass and velocity distributions is theoretical; so it must al-
ready have been packed into the formula G(Q, T) and will consequently occur within
the scope of ($t) in ($t) G(Q, t).
Let us now address the problems posed by the logico-mathematical principles of a
scientific system. It is well-known that classical logic consists of infinitely many axi-
oms subsumed by various schemes. But since every model of G(Q, T) automatically
satisfies the logical schemes, the latter need not occur explicitly in G(Q, T). A serious
problem however arises in connection with the strictly mathematical axioms. As long
as the latter were taken to be analytic, they could be regarded as part of the logical
background. But mathematics has long been acknowledged to be synthetic, so that its
postulates should figure explicitly in G(Q, T). Basic mathematical concepts like those
of class and class-membership should therefore be quantified over as we pass from
G(Q, T) to the Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t). A major difficulty stems from the fact
that mathematics is normally articulated within the framework of Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory (ZFC). The latter possesses infinitely many axioms while ($t) G(Q, t) is in-
tended to be a finite formula of the object-language. It is therefore essential for us to
show that mathematics, or rather that part of it which is used within the sciences, is
finitely axiomatisable. This can actually be established by using Gödelian methods [See
Appendices 1 and 2. Also K. Gödel 1940].
Having the class-theoretic machinery at one’s disposal offers considerable advan-
tages. For example: a finite number of individual names a1, … , am, u1, … , us can be
added to our primitive vocabulary in such a way that, for each j = 1, 2, … , m, the
symbol aj stands for the extension of the predicate Tj. In this way set-theory can be
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brought to bear on all classes of physical, as well as of mathematical entities; so we
end up with a system of the form G(k, Î, a1, … , am, u1, … , us, Q1, … , Qn ) which in-
corporates applied mathematics and whose Ramsey-sentence is
($k, Î)($Æ, a1, …, am, u1, … , us ) G(k, Î, a1, … , am, u1, … , us, Q1, … , Qn )
where: the monadic predicate k and the dyadic relation Î are defined as follows:
k(x)  º  [x is a class];  (x Î y)  º  [x is a member of the class y].
Note moreover that ($k, Î) represents the only second-order quantifications which
need to be carried out in order to obtain the Ramsey-sentence ($k, Î)($a1, …, am, u1,
… , us ) G(k, Î, a1, … , am, u1, … , us, Q1, … , Qn ). Should we consider the notions of
class (k) and of class-membership (Î) as logical constants, hence as not to be quantified
over, then the Ramsey-sentence would reduce to the first-order formula
($a1, … , am, u1, … , us ) G(k, Î, a1, … , am, u1, … , us, Q1, … , Qn ).
It should however be noted that the conclusions drawn in the rest of this paper in no
way depend on any extra assumptions concerning the first-order character of the Ram-
sey-sentence; for the latter anyway turns out, in most of the examples adduced below,
to be logically equivalent to a first-order formula.
3. Newman’s Criticism of Russell’s Position
Several authors have recently expressed major objections to SSR; objections so major
that they raise questions about the very “possibility” of structural realism. For any
proposition H, let H* henceforth denote the Ramsey-sentence of H. Thus:
(G(Q, T))*  =Def  ($t) G(Q, t).
The objections are, essentially, as follows:
(i) SSR leads to the view that the cognitive content of any scientific theory H is
fully captured by H*.
(ii) But as was allegedly first shown by the mathematician M.H.A. Newman —re-
sponding to Russell’s version of structural realism— a theory’s Ramsey-
sentence is satisfiable in a “trivial” way, supposedly imposing no more than
a cardinality constraint on our domain of discourse [M.H.A. Newman 1928].
(iii) However, scientific theories clearly do much more than impose constraints on
the size of the universe.
(iv) So structural realism is committed to an entirely untenable account of the cog-
nitive content of scientific theories, namely that this content is captured by
the theory’s Ramsey-sentence, and is itself untenable.
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Newman’s argument was reintroduced into the philosophy of science by Demo-
poulos and Friedman —and via their article, it has attracted a good deal of attention in
the past few years [W. Demopoulos & M. Friedman 1985].
I shall however show that despite appearing to be cogent, Newman’s objections
owe their superficial reasonableness to an easily corrigible oversight on Russell’s part.
After rectifying Russell’s error, it will be seen that Newman’s argument in no way
threatens structural realism —though consideration of this argument helps towards
clarifying important aspects of SSR.
4. Ramseyfication and “Trivialisation”
According to Demopoulos and Friedman, Newman showed that any view which
identifies the cognitive content of a scientific theory with that of its Ramsey-sentence
faces “insurmountable difficulties”; and there is no denying that in his [1927] Russell
unfortunately spoke of a purely structural description of reality being inferred from per-
ceptual results. The fault lies not so much with the inductive overtones of the verb ‘in-
fer’, invalid though any such inference might be; as with the implicit assumption that
once the inference is carried out, an exclusively structural account is obtained in which
no observational terms occur. After being used during the inferential process, all ob-
servations are supposedly shed, thus yielding a structural proposition H(T1, … , Tm ) in
which all the predicates T1, … , Tm are theoretical. The proposition H(T1, … , Tm ) will
henceforth be assumed to be a first-order sentence. Ramseyfying, we obtain ($t1, t2,
… , tm ) H(t1, … , tm ); where ($t1, t2, … , tm ) H(t1, … , tm ) expresses a mere consistency
condition for H(T1, … , Tm ); i.e. it means that H(T1, … , Tm ) possesses at least one
model, a result guaranteed by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.
In conformity with his overall philosophical position, Russell could however have
adopted an alternative, more precisely: a hypothetico-deductivist, approach. He could
have put forward a mixed first-order proposition G(Q1, … , Qn, T1, … , Tm ), where
the observational terms Q1, … , Qn figure alongside the theoretical predicates T1, … ,
Tm. Being empirically falsifiable, the corresponding Ramsey-sentence, namely ($t1, t2,
… ,  tm ) G(Q1, … , Qn, t1, … , tm ), would then have been seen to be far from trivially
satisfiable. Note however that this defence of Russell’s thesis is predicated on a divi-
sion between “theoretical” and “observational” terms; where the latter are taken to be
understood in advance of any physical theory, i.e. directly and without any involve-
ment of description. This means that those “antecedently understood” predicates re-
tain their meaning (that is, in extension) from interpretation to interpretation. But if
our basic notions are all “objective”, i.e. transcendent and hence known exclusively by
description, then we are bound to end up with an observationally untestable system of
the form H(T1, … , Tm ).
Such an extreme structuralist position is exposed to two twin dangers, those of
scepticism and of utter triviality. Every scientific system like H(T1, … , Tm ) is sup-
posed to contain ordinary arithmetic and to be both consistent and axiomatisable.
H(T1, … , Tm ) must therefore be incomplete; so that, for at least one sentence B, nei-
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ther B nor ¬B follows logically from H(T1, … , Tm ). B, or alternatively ¬B, can there-
fore be consistently added to H(T1, … , Tm ), thus yielding two new incompatible sys-
tems. Continuing in this way, it can be shown that there exist any number of internally
consistent, but mutually incompatible theories each one of which contains H(T1, … ,
… ,Tm ); and it would be impossible to give any epistemological preference to one of
these systems over any other. Thus we end up with the sort of scepticism which turns
the undeniable technological progress of the sciences into an ongoing miracle.
As for the danger of triviality: as already explained, if structural realism did imply
that all that can be “known” is structure, then it would entail that scientific hypotheses
are indistinguishable from (consistent) mathematical systems and hence face insur-
mountable difficulties. In fact however, the view is that while theoretical entities are
known only via description, observational entities are known both by ostension and
by description; for it should be noted that in the global description G(Q1, … , Qn, T1,
… , Tm ), the theoretical T ’s are indissolubly entangled with the observational Q ’s.
Nowadays, it is generally held that there is no absolute or sharp distinction be-
tween theoretical and observational predicates. But Russell (along with Poincaré,
Grover Maxwell and Ayer) would —rightly— identify the observational predicates
with those decidable “phenomenologically” on the basis perception [see Grover
Maxwell 1971]. Here however, we need not commit ourselves to any particular ac-
count of the “observational basis” of science. But however exactly the distinction is
understood, no serious version of structural realism can get going without some such
distinction. If all the predicates of a scientific theory are taken to be interpreted only
within the context of the claims made by the theory, if, that is, none is taken to be an-
chored in experience independently of our attempted descriptions of the universe,
then the constraints imposed by the Ramsey-sentence (or indeed by the original theory
itself) would be hopelessly weak. For the theory would then be indistinguishable from
a formal mathematical system, where the latter is —properly— subject to a mere con-
sistency condition. The criticism of those who object to structural realism would then
reduce to the ungainsayable truism that a consistent formal theory constitutes an “im-
plicit definition” of its primitive concepts; i.e. it merely determines a class of models
[see D. Lewis 1970].
It should immediately be granted that Demopoulos and Friedman seem to be
aware of this possible counter-objection. So they entered the caveat that only what the
Ramsey-sentence asserts over and above its observational content is reducible to logic or to
mathematics; more precisely: to a consistency or to a cardinality constraint. This “over
and above” however proves to be essentially indefinable; for on the one hand, the
Ramsey-sentence does not normally follow from its empirical basis, i.e. from the set of
true and empirically decidable, hence singular sentences. If, on the other hand, all the
—generally undecidable— “empirical generalisations” were included in the observa-
tional content of a theory, then the Ramsey-sentence might well turn out to be one of
them; in which case Demopoulos’s and Friedman’s thesis collapses into the trivial
claim that the Ramsey-sentence follows from itself.
Consider the following —admittedly simplistic— example. Let
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A  º  [("x) (F(x) ® T(x)) Ù ("y) (T( y) ® K( y))],
where T is a theoretical notion, while both F and K are observational concepts. Thus
A*  º  ($t ) [("x) (F(x) ® t(x)) Ù ("y) (t( y) ® K( y))].
It is obvious that  ð [A* « ("x) (F(x) ® K(x))]. Thus A* is provably equivalent
to a first-order sentence. Let {aj : j Î D} be a set of distinct names for all the observ-
able entities in the world. D could therefore be infinite. Assume that F(aj) Ù K(aj) has
been ascertained as true for all j Î D. If we are to believe Demopoulos and Friedman,
what the Ramsey-sentence asserts beyond {F(aj) Ù K(aj): j Î D} is merely tautological.
This claim can be easily refuted as follows. First note that the logical difference be-
tween two statements Y and X —i.e. the weakest formula which, taken in conjunction
with X, entails Y — is (¬X Ú Y ) or (X ® Y ); but we are here dealing, not with the
difference between A* and a single statement, but with that between A* and the infi-
nite set of reports {F(aj) Ù K(aj): j Î D}. For the sake of argument, let us nonetheless
suppose that the infinite conjunction T{F(aj) Ù K(aj): j Î D} is syntactically well-
formed. Demopoulos and Friedman’s thesis is tantamount to the claim that
T{F(aj) Ù K(aj): j Î D} ® A*  is a logical truth; i.e. that
{F(aj) Ù K(aj): j Î D} ð ("x) (F(x) ® K(x)).
That this inference is invalid can most easily be established by considering any do-
main D" É D.  D" clearly yields a model of {F(aj) Ù K(aj): j Î D} which falsifies
("x) (F(x) ® K(x)).
We have already mentioned that some philosophers might choose to consider the
“generalisation” ("x) (F(x) ® K(x)), i.e. the Ramsey sentence A* itself, as belonging
to the empirical basis of the hypothesis A. This would however transgress the canons
of even the most liberal version of empiricism; for ("x) (F(x) ® K(x)) fails to be fully
empirically decidable. This is precisely why prominent logical positivists decided to re-
gard synthetic universal statements as expressing inference rules rather than genuine
propositions [V. Kraft 1968, pp. 121-137].
5. What cognitive Difference, if any, is there between X and X*?
Summing up what was established above: once a distinction is made between the theo-
retical notions and a fixed set of observational predicates, both Newman’s and the
Demopoulos-Friedman objections fail.
Let us now go back to the general case of a hypothesis G(Q, T) and of its Ramsey-
sentence ($t) G(Q, t). Again note that the observational predicates Q are not quanti-
fied over, for they are taken to have referents fixed independently of G. It will easily
be proved that the Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t) does not merely constrain the cardi-
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nality of its models —in fact, it sometimes does less than this, but generally it does
much more.
Let us compare the logical strengths of the two formulas
($t) G(Q, t)  and  G(Q, T).
First note that —unsurprisingly:
(1)  ð [G(Q, T) ® ($t) G(Q, t)];
i.e. the original theory always entails its Ramsey-sentence.
Consider next the logical difference:
(2)  [($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)]
between G(Q, T) and ($t) G(Q, t).
As is well-known, Carnap looked upon (2) as an analytic meaning-postulate. [R.
Carnap 1966; Chapter 28, p. 270]. But from a strictly logical viewpoint, his notion of
analyticity and his manner of arriving at the conclusion that (X* ® X ) is an analytic
meaning A-postulate are highly suspect. He starts by singling out the sequence Q1,
… , Qn  of all observational notions occurring in some scientific hypothesis G(Q1, … ,
… , Qn, T1, … , Tm ). Since n is usually large, he introduces abbreviations by means of
so-called D-rules. To my mind, these can be expressed only metalinguistically. For ex-
ample: both ‘animal’ and ‘bird’ might stand for conjunctions of certain Qi ’s, where the
Qi ’s defining ‘animal’ figure in the definiens of ‘bird’. There is of course nothing wrong
with such D-rules which are used in order to simplify presentation; but sentences
containing words like ‘animal’ or ‘bird’ will not be statements expressed in the primi-
tive object-language. They can be transformed into such statements through replacing
‘animal’ and ‘bird’ by their definiens in terms of the Qi ’s. Once this is done, then propo-
sitions like
(A1) All birds are animals,
prove to be logically true.
In this sense, there is no harm in calling the statement (A1) analytic. Carnap how-
ever proposes to circumvent the D-rules and directly regard (A1) as an analytic
A-postulate; which clearly entails that sentences like (A1) must now belong to the ob-
ject-language and hence that ‘bird’ and ‘animal’ have been added to our primitive vo-
cabulary. But then (A1) should be regarded as a synthetic judgement. In other words:
once a primitive vocabulary and a list of logical constants have been selected, then one
can no longer decree what formulas ought to be considered as analytic; for even ac-
cording to Carnap himself, analyticity must ultimately coincide with logical truth, i.e
with truth under all interpretations of the primitive descriptive terms.
Anyway, to speak of (A1) as of a meaning-postulate seems to me to conflate syntax
with semantics. Since notions like those of meaning, reference and truth-value are se-
mantic in character, they cannot be adequately rendered by syntax alone; for they in-
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volve a reference both to language and to something extra-linguistic. It cannot legiti-
mately be claimed that (A1) talks, not only about birds and animals, but also about the
meanings of the words ‘bird’ and ‘animal’. Here, Frege’s fundamental insight ought to
be adhered to: irrespective of the extent to which they might initially have been in-
formed by philosophical considerations, syntactical rules should subsequently fend for
themselves. And the best way of avoiding Carnap’s ambiguities is to abolish all talk of
meaning-postulates; hence to regard (A1) as a synthetic axiom expressed in the primi-
tive vocabulary of an enriched object-language. As for the Carnapian concept of a
meaning-postulate, it can be retrieved through that of a metaphysical proposition —in
Popper’s sense. The meaning-postulates should be characterised as axioms whose
conjunction is metaphysical, i.e. observationally irrefutable. This in no way implies that
such conjunctions do no empirical work within the context of a global system; for the
omission of a metaphysical component from a scientific hypothesis might well dimin-
ish and even destroy the latter’s observational content.
Let us now show in what way our conclusions apply to the difference
($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)
between the theory G(Q, T) and its Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t). Here, Carnap’s
claim that this difference is analytic proves untenable; for otherwise, by the very defi-
nition given by Carnap, ($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T) ought to be reducible, by means of
D-postulates, to a logically true formula. This is however far from being normally the
case; for the Qi ’s and the Tj ’s can be taken to be primitive predicates belonging to the
underlying object-language, thus pre-empting any recourse to D-rules. This often en-
ables us to determine a model of ($t) G(Q, t) which falsifies G(Q, T) and hence also
($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T). Consider the theory A with its Ramsey-sentence A* defined
above; also any domain in which F, K and T denote the classes F0, K0 and T0 respec-
tively, where F0 Í K0  but  Not(F0 Í T0). This yields a model of A* under which A is
false. A theory is thus essentially stronger than its Ramsey-sentence.
Let us call any proposition containing no theoretical terms an O-sentence; and let
us define a basic statement as any singular O-sentence which is fully empirically
decidable. It will be shown that (2) is not only empirically irrefutable and hence meta-
physical, but also that it entails no synthetic O-sentence. For suppose that
ð [(($t) G(Q, t)) ® G(Q, T))) ® Z ],
i.e.
ð [(¬($t) G(Q, t)) Ú G(Q, T))) ® Z ],
where Z does not contains any Tj. Quantifying over T, obtain
ð [($t) (¬($t) G(Q, t) Ú G(Q, t))) ® Z ],
i.e.:
ð [(¬($t) G(Q, t) Ú ($t) G(Q, t)) ® Z ];
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whence:
ð Z;
i.e. Z is a logical or mathematical truth.
It follows that proposition (2) is not analytic but metaphysical.
To sum up: Carnap’s mistake consists in his having conflated ‘analytic’ with ‘meta-
physical’; which, given his positivist stance, was almost bound to happen. For accord-
ing to neopositivism, the absence of an empirically ascertainable content is tanta-
mount to absence of content tout court. But this neopositivist dichotomy between the
empirical and the analytic, where the latter includes the logical truths, the mathemati-
cal principles and all the meaning-postulates, is totally wrong-headed. All we need are
Popper’s notions of logical truth and of metaphysical proposition. We can legitimately
regard the synthetic mathematical principles, which are trivially irrefutable, as meta-
physical. By definition, the remaining propositions will be empirically testable and
hence scientific; all of which presupposes that we stick to one chosen primitive vo-
cabulary including a list of logical constants. Carnap’s meaning-postulates concerning
the observational predicates can be replaced by metalinguistic D-rules; i.e. by verbal
definitions specifying how certain abbreviations are to be used. Since the D-rules do
not belong to the object-language, they are in principle dispensable and hence call for
no special treatment. As for the difference (X* ® X ) between X and its Ramsey-
sentence X*, it does not constitute an analytic meaning-postulate but a metaphysical
proposition all of whose consequences are likewise irrefutable.
In his [1999], S. Psillos allowed himself to be misled by Carnap into holding that a
structural realist who postulates X* must also accept, as merely analytic, the proposition
(X* ® X ). Such a realist is thus allegedly forced to infer the fully-fledged theory X
[pp. 51-69]. When Psillos further claims that the truth of the interpreted hypothesis X is
an empirical matter, he presupposes that an interpretation, not only of the observa-
tional, but also of the theoretical predicates can and must be specified in terms of
natural kinds. But this is precisely where the problem lies; for whereas X can in prin-
ciple be refuted through the falsification of any of its observational consequences, as-
certaining the truth of X must proceed through the interpretation of its theoretical
terms. The latter however refer to the external world; so that, barring what Putnam
rightly calls a mystical insight, we are unable to break out of our intentional sphere and
fix a semantic relation between our theoretical vocabulary and some transcendent reality.
Note that the structural realist in no way denies that the whole of a scientific theory is
physically interpretable; he simply points to the epistemological fact that we are in princi-
ple unable effectively to carry out such an integral interpretation. Though capable of
giving a syntactic-structuralist account of ‘natural kinds’, the structural realist refuses
to accept, as analytic, the implication (X* ® X ) which he correctly regards as a syn-
thetic, albeit metaphysical proposition.
Let us now go back to examining, in very general terms, the relationship between
the theory G(Q, T), its Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t) and the presence or absence of
any observational predicates in G(Q, T).
Ramseyfication and structural realism 15
We propose first to show that G(Q, T) and ($t) G(Q, t) are not only observation-
ally identical but that they furthermore imply the same O-sentences. By (1), every con-
sequence of ($t) G(Q, t) is also trivially entailed by G(Q, T). Conversely, let H(Q, T)
be any logical consequence of G(Q, T). That is:
(3)  ð G(Q, T) ® H(Q, T).
Quantifying over T, infer:
(4)  ð ("t) [G(Q, t) ® H(Q, t)].
An immediate consequence of (4) is:
(5)  ð [($t) G(Q, t) ® ($t) H(Q, t)].
Note first that (5) is in general much weaker than (4); secondly that, in (3), we
could have generalised over all the predicates Qi and Tj. We refrained from doing so
precisely because the Qi ’s are observational, hence possess fixed accessible meanings;
so that quantifying over them —as Newman seems to have done— would involve a
loss of valuable empirical information. Two importantly different cases must now be
considered.
[a] H contains no occurrences of any Tj ’s and is therefore an O-sentence. Thus we
can write H’(Q) for H(Q, T). In this case, (4) is actually equivalent to:
(6)  ð [($t) G(Q, t) ® H’(Q)].
(3) and (6) tells us that G(Q, T) and its Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t) have the same
O-consequences and are a fortiori observationally identical. Should H’(Q) turn out to
be a basic statement, then (6) would enable us, through the experimental verification
of ¬H’(Q), to refute ($t) G(Q, t). Referring to the example given in Section 1: both A
and A* could be refuted by a basic statement of the form F(a) Ù ¬K(a).
Thus the Ramsey-sentence of every scientific theory has empirical import and does
not convey information only about the cardinality of its domain of discourse. In fact,
the difference [($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)] between a fully-fledged scientific hypothesis
G(Q, T) and its Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t) fits exactly Popper’s definition of a
metaphysical thesis. It might prima facie be thought that Popper held a proposition M
to be metaphysical if and only if M is a priori in the sense of being independent of ex-
perience, i.e. of being neither provable nor falsifiable by observation. But Popper in-
sisted only on the empirical irrefutability condition, thus conceding that M might be
experimentally verifiable. [($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)]  illustrates this possibility. We have
seen that [($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)] entails no synthetic O-statement and is a fortiori
untestable. [($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)] could however be experimentally verified
through the empirical refutation of ($t) G(Q, t), which was shown to be observation-
ally equivalent to the scientific theory G(Q, T). Thus Carnap ended up by regarding an
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empirically verifiable statement, namely [($t) G(Q, t) ® G(Q, T)], as analytic and hence,
according to the Logical Positivists themselves, as devoid of sense. This is why there is
to my mind no doubt as to the superiority of Popper’s trichotomy into scientific,
metaphysical and logically true propositions, over Carnap’s excluded middle between
analytic and empirical statements.
The question now arises as to whether some (non-empirical) reason could make us
accept the theory G(Q, T) over and above the logically weaker Ramsey-sentence
($t) G(Q, t). The answer to this question will be shown to be decidedly negative.
According to structuralism, there exist no experimental, theoretical or even aes-
thetic reason which would make us opt for G(Q, T) in preference to the logically
weaker Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t): first, we have seen that G(Q, T) and ($t) G(Q, t)
have exactly the same O-consequences; secondly, no unity or simplicity criteria could
possibly demarcate between G(Q, t) and ($t) G(Q, t); for apart from the existential
quantifier ($t), the two formulas have essentially the same syntactical structure. [In the
case of the propositions A and A* above, A* even proves to be simpler than A.]
[b] Let us now turn to the second special case of (3) where H(Q, T) is assumed to
contain no occurrence of any observational predicates Qi. We can thus write H”(T)
for H(Q, T), so that (5) reduces to the statement:
(6)  ð [($t) G(Q, t) ® ($t) H”(t)].
H”(T) could e.g. be the sentence ($q) G(q, T), so that, by (6):
(7)  ð [($t) G(Q, t) ® ($t)($q) G(q, t)], which is a logical truth.
This important special subcase arises if all the terms contained in G(Q, T) are re-
garded as theory-laden and hence as essentially theoretical. I hold this ‘modern’ view
to be deeply mistaken; for it would mislead us into quantifying over all the predicates
occurring in G(Q, T), thus yielding not ($t) G(Q, t) but ($t)($q) G(q, t) as the Ram-
sey-sentence of G(Q, T). Whatever the case may be, it is clear that ($t) H”(t) might
well express a tautology or a logical contradiction.
So far, no information about the cardinality of our domain of discourse has been
conveyed. Such information will be forthcoming only in the case of finite domains;
for if H”(T) is first-order and has one infinite model, then H”(T), and hence also
($t) H”(t), will possess infinite models of arbitrarily large cardinalities [by the ‘upward’
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem]. As for the finite case, it arises if H”(T) were e.g. a for-
mula of the form:
[("x) T1(x) Ù ($x1, x2, … , xr ) ((x1 ¹ x2) Ù (x1 ¹ x3) Ù …
… Ù (xr–1 ¹ xr) Ù ("x) (T1(x)  «  ((x = x1) Ú (x = x2) Ú … Ú (x = xr ))))],
where r is a specific natural number. ($t1) H”(t1) would then be equivalent to the as-
sertion that the domain of individuals consists of exactly r members.
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To sum up: the Ramsey-sentence ($t) G(Q, t) reduces to ($t) H”(t) only if n = 0;
i.e. only if there exist no observational predicates at all; or alternatively: if no distinc-
tion is made between the observational and the theoretical terms. This is however far
from being the position of prominent structural realists like Poincaré, Duhem and
Russell. The structural realist is committed only to regarding our knowledge of the
theoretical predicates T1, … , Tm as wholly conveyed by the nexus G(Q1, … , Qn,
T1,…, Tm ); i.e. to holding that T1, …, Tm are known exclusively by description, namely
through their mutual relations and the way —described by G(Q1, … , Qn, T1, … ,
… ,Tm )— in which they link up with the observational predicates Q1, … , Qn. As for
the latter, they are known both by description, via G(Q1, … , Qn, T1, … , Tm ), and by
acquaintance, i.e. phenomenologically or ostensively. In the last analysis, the Demo-
poulos-Friedman objection rests on the unwarranted assumption that the structural
realist is bound to deny the observational/theoretical distinction.
6. Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments
At first sight, Putnam’s results constitute the most powerful argument against scien-
tific realism —whether classical or structural. Putnam showed that given any epistemi-
cally ideal theory TI , we have no reason not to regard TI as being true [see H. Putnam
1983]. We shall moreover prove that given certain cardinality constraints, TI possesses
a ‘standard model’ in the world, i.e. a model in which all the observational notions
have their commonly accepted meanings. This would entail that the Ramsey-sentence
TI * of TI is true simpliciter.
In order to assess the relevance and scope of Putnam’s theorem, it is necessary
briefly to examine his proof and its presuppositions. We shall then discuss whether
structural realism is really undermined by Putnam’s results.
Putnam denotes by S the set of all observable entities. Thus S Í W, where ‘W ’
denotes the whole universe. Since the results of all measurements are signified by ra-
tional numbers, S can be taken to be enumerable. A set of empirical predicates
{pi : i Î W} is also posited, where, for each i Î W and for all a, b, … , g in S,  pi (a, b,
… , g) is supposed to be ascertainably true or false. An epistemically ideal theory TI is
then defined as any consistent first-order system which possesses a set of terms
{ta : a Î S} such that TI ð (ta ¹ tb) for any two distinct elements a and b of S. For
each i Î W, TI is furthermore required to possess a predicate Pi which has the same
number of argument-places as pi and is such that, for all a, b, … , g in S, we have:
TI  ð Pi (ta, tb, … , tg )  if pi (a, b, … ,g ) is true, and
TI  ð ¬Pi (ta, tb, … , tg )  if pi(a, b, … ,g ) is false.
Let J be any model of TI . Put:
(8)  ta  =Def  J(ta)   for all a Î S.
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It can easily be shown that  pi (a, b, … , g)  º  J(Pi )(ta, tb , … ,tg ) for all a, b, … , g in
S. Thus suppose that pi (a, b, … , g) is true. By hypothesis,
TI  ð Pi (ta, tb, … , tg ).
Since J is a model of TI , then J(Pi )( J(ta ), J(tb), … , J(tg )), i.e. J(Pi )(ta, tb , … , tg ), is
true. And if pi (a, b, … , g ) is false, then again by hypothesis,
TI  ð ¬Pi (ta, tb, … , tg ).
hence J(¬Pi (ta, tb, … , tg )) is true; that is: J(Pi (ta, tb, … , tg )), which is identical with
J(Pi )(ta, tb , … , tg ), is false. Thus:
(9)  J(Pi )(ta, tb , …, tg )  º  pi (a, b, … , g ),  for all a, b, …, g in S.
J  will be said to be standard if, for all a Î S, we have: J(ta) = a,  i.e. if ta = a.
(9) entails that in a standard model:
(10)  J(Pi )(a, b, … , g)  º  pi (a, b, … , g ),  for all a, b, … , g in S;
i.e., for all i in W, J(Pi ) coincides with pi on S.
Although epistemically ideal systems are almost impossible to construct in practice,
it will be assumed, if only for the sake of argument, that at least one such theory is
achievable.
Putnam established that every epistemically ideal TI has a standard model; for by
the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, TI has at least one (countable) model, J say. Letting
D be the domain of J, we have, by (8):
{ta: a Î S}  =  { J(ta ): a Î S}  Í  D.
Put:  D = {ta: a Î S} and D' = D\D = D\{ta: a Î S}. Thus:
(11)  D  =  D È D'  =  {ta : a Î S} È D'.
Hence |D| = |D| + |D'| = |{ta: a Î S}| + |D'|.
Since TI  ð ta ¹ tb  for a ¹ b  then  J(ta) ¹ J(tb)  since J is a model of TI. Hence:
(12)  ta ¹ tb  for a ¹ b.
Therefore: |D| = |{ta: a Î S}| = |S|. By the above:
(13)  |D| = |D| + |D'| = |S| + |D'|.
Note that if S is taken to be infinite, then D, and hence every model J of TI  will be
infinite. Now define the one-one map ƒ as follows:
(14)  ƒ(ta ) = a  for all a Î S;
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and for any µ Î D', define ƒ(µ) in any way consistent with the requirement that the re-
sulting ƒ be a bijection whose domain is the whole of D.
Now determine the interpretation J0 as follows. The domain of J0 will be the set:
(15)  D0  =Def  S È ƒ[D']  =  {ƒ(ta ): a Î S} È {ƒ(µ): µ Î D'}.
For any function letter (or name) g, let:
(16)  J0( g )( x, h, … , z )  =Def  ƒ( J( g )(ƒ–1(x), ƒ–1(h), … , ƒ–1(z ))),
for any x, h, … , z  in D0.
Finally, for any predicate R, define:
(17)  J0(R)( x, h, … , z )  ºDef  J(R)(ƒ–1(x), ƒ–1(h), … , ƒ–1(z )),
for all x, h, … , z  in D0.
As is well-known, (16) entails:
(18)  J0(u) = ƒ( J(u)),
for all terms u. Trivially: since J is a model of TI , then so is J0 (for J0 can be considered
as obtained by relabelling the elements of J). J0 is furthermore a standard model, since:
(19)  J0(ta) = ƒ( J(ta)) [by (18)]  =Def  ƒ(ta)  =Def  a [by (14)].
This result can be strengthened by imposing constraints on the cardinalities of
various sets. Let us henceforth assume that the world W is infinite and that TI has at
least one infinite model; then by the ‘upward’ Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, TI has a
model having cardinality |W|. In the above, it can therefore be assumed that
|D| = |W|. Let us moreover suppose that |W| > |S|; which is not an unreasonable
assumption, since S is countable while the set of all physical events has at least the
power of the continuum. Thus:
(20)  W  =  S È S',  where S'  =Def  (W \ S).
Hence |W| = |S| + |S'|.
Since W is infinite and |W| > |S|, it follows that:
(21)  |W| = |S'|.
Thus |W| = |D| = |S| + |D'| [by (13)].
Since |W| is infinite and greater than |S|,
(22) |W| = |D'|;
hence |S'| = |W| = |D'|; and so:
(23)  W  =  S È S' ;
D = {ta: a Î S} È D';  where |S'| = |W| = |D| = |D'|.
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Let y be any one-one map of D' onto S'. Going back to (14), we see that ƒ can be
defined as follows:
(24)  ƒ(ta ) =Def  a
for all a Î S; and for any µ Î D', let ƒ(µ) =Def  y(µ).
By (23) and (24), ƒ maps {ta: a Î S} È D' = D È D' = D one-one onto
S È S' = W. Thus W = [Range of ƒ ]  =Def  D0. By the above, J0 is a standard model
of TI in the world W; which clearly entails that the Ramsey-sentence TI * of TI is stan-
dardly true in W, or true simpliciter. The question now is: should the structural realist be
worried about these results? We shall show that the answer is decidedly negative.
Putnam in effect provides a partial answer to a question posed by Einstein in his
Weltbild; namely: is a scientific hypothesis which accounts for all the facts uniquely
determined by the latter? [A. Einstein 1934, pp. 175-180]. Putnam has effectively
shown that truth —rather than uniqueness— might well be attainable. More precisely:
given the consistency of an epistemically ideal theory TI, we have no empirical reason
not to hold the Ramsey-sentence TI * of TI to be true. Given further assumptions
about the cardinalities of the world W and of the models of TI , we can even assert the
truth of TI *. Qua structural realists, we would thus know that the structure described
by TI is realised in the world. In principle, a problem arises only if two ideal theories TI
and HI were such that TI * and HI * are logically incompatible; but Jane English has
proved that this is never the case if —as is tacitly assumed— an epistemically ideal theory
entails no false observational statement (i.e. no false O-sentence) [Jane English 1980].
It is therefore as unexceptionable for a structural realist to claim that the two struc-
tures displayed by TI and by HI are realised in W as it is for a mathematician to accept
that the same set can exhibit both an algebraic and a topological structure.
The more demanding structural realist can go further than this, but only by ap-
pealing to a metaphysical principle similar to the one invoked by both Poincaré and
Einstein. The latter put it as follows: the world must be taken to be the realisation of
what is mathematically simplest. As for Poincaré, he held the degree of unity of a hy-
pothesis to be an index of its truth-likeness. Note that despite being incapable of epis-
temologically distinguishing between a theory and its Ramsey-sentence, i.e. between TI
and TI *, we can certainly adjudicate between TI and HI, or rather between TI * and
HI *. We might e.g. come to the conclusion that TI * is more unified than HI *; given
the principle just stated, only TI * will be taken to reflect —if only approximately—
the real structure of W. Thus, only in the case of TI * do we allow ourselves to inter-
pret realistically the second-order existential quantifications over the theoretical predi-
cates. According to Poincaré, we would otherwise be attributing ‘too great a role to
chance’; i.e. the excess ‘organic compactness’ of TI * over HI * would have to be re-
garded as an accidental feature of TI *; and we know that theoretical physicists of
Poincaré’s or of Einstein’s temper of mind are most reluctant to regard such accidents
as ultimately inexplicable.
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The above considerations also show that a structural realist can account for the
notion of natural kind without abandoning his syntactic-structuralist stance. For the
best guide as to what kinds are natural is the degree of unity of a theory like TI , or of
any highly successful hypothesis T in which such kinds play a central role. In other
words: natural kinds are precisely those signified by the predicate and function sym-
bols which give T its most coherent formulation. Let us repeat that both the empirical
content and the so-called ‘degree of internal perfection’ of a theory T coincide with
those of its Ramsey-sentence T*; so there is nothing to choose between T and T*.
Note also that a most ardent defender of natural kinds, namely David Lewis, grants
that those kinds are natural which are talked about by our best theories. [D. Lewis
1970, p. 428]. But what are these ‘best’ theories? They are clearly those highly unified
hypotheses which save the facts without ad hoc assumptions. Thus, we do not possess
a prior insight into natural kinds on which we then base our conjectures; we rather
start by formulating empirically adequate hypotheses and then select, from among
them, the most unified theory, T say.  T* will then express exactly what we want to as-
sert; namely that the theoretical predicates quantified over in T* denote the natural kinds
which are really actualised in the world. In this sense, the Keplerian (near-) ellipses, as op-
posed to the complex curves which would have to be postulated by any Tychonic
reformulation of Kepler’s laws, really exist. Similarly: let E be Einstein’s gravitational
theory and let N denote any of its ‘Euclidean reformulations’. N is known to be em-
pirically equivalent to E, at any rate within a large region of the spatio-temporal mani-
fold. Scientists —who normally are demanding realists— do not look upon the unity
displayed by the structure of E, as opposed to the ad hoc character of N, as an acci-
dental feature of E. They hold that E describes reality more adequately than does N.
Let us finally add that no ideal theory like TI has so far been put forward; and it
seems doubtful that such a theory could ever be achieved in practice. So science must
content itself with provisional hypotheses, or rather with the latter’s Ramsey-
sentences, which might at best be compatible with all known experimental results. It is
precisely in these situations that SSR proves its mettle. Consider two such hypotheses
—call them T1 and T2 — which are empirically identical. Thus both T1 and T2 could
subsequently be refuted —by the same facts. Yet T2 —but not T1 — might possess a
structure which points, or heuristically leads to a more powerful theory, S say; where S
supersedes both T1 and T2 empirically. S might e.g. explain some of the results which
undermined T1 and hence also T2; yet only the structure of T2 survives —possibly in a
modified form— in S. As an example, take the case where: S º Quantum Mechanics;
T1 º Newtonian Dynamics; and T2 º (Classical) Hamiltonian Dynamics. This example
is instructive, first because it does not rely on hindsight: long before the birth of
Quantum Physics, Poincaré had noted that despite their strict observational equiva-
lence, T1 and T2 have very different structures and hence make different statements
about the world. Secondly: as we go over from T2 to S, only the mathematical struc-
ture, as typified by the form of the Hamiltonian function, is preserved; even the logical
types of this function’s arguments are altered: whereas the arguments of the classical
Hamiltonian are functions of the time-variable, those of its quantum-mechanical cor-
Elie G. ZAHAR22
relate are operators, i.e. functions of functions, hence higher-order entities. No exam-
ple illustrates more clearly the essential role played by the notion of structure in the
development of fundamental science.
It might be maintained that structural realism does not deserve its name. This, of
course, is a purely terminological and hence irrefutable objection. It can nonetheless
be pointed out that the most prominent advocates of structural realism, namely Du-
hem, Poincaré and Russell were intuitive realists; they instinctively believed in the ex-
istence of a structured and mind-independent reality which the scientist tries to cap-
ture; but their —ungainsayable— insight was that our knowledge of the mode of ref-
erence of theoretical terms is as problematic as that of the truth of scientific hypothe-
ses. According to these authors as well as to a modern realist like E. MacMullin, we
are entitled to regard some of our concepts as metaphors, which nonetheless model the
external world; in which case there is no longer any question of a strict term-by-term ref-
erence to anything at all, whether it be intended or not [E. MacMullin 1984].
Appendix 1: Informal Presentation of the Problem
[I] Despite all efforts made to reduce it to Logic, Mathematics remains a synthetic dis-
cipline. Moreover, basic notions like those of class [k] and of class-membership [Î]
can hardly be claimed to be known by acquaintance. Hence k and Î are theoretical
predicates. The conjunction M of all mathematical postulates must therefore form an
explicit part of every physical system G; so that the predicates k & Î ought to be
quantified over in the Ramsey-sentence of G.
[II] As usually formulated, M consists of an infinite number of axioms, namely
those of ZFC; whereas G is taken to be a finite (first-order) formula.
[III] Hence some method of finitely axiomatising M must be found. This has al-
ready been achieved —for pure mathematics— by Gödel in his [1940]. Gödel’s basic
idea is as follows. In ZFC, consider e.g. the Replacement Scheme, which subsumes a
denumerable infinity of axioms; namely:
("u) [("x)($*y) B(x, y) ® ($v)("y) ((y Î v) « ($x Î u) B(x, y))];
where B(x, y) is an arbitrary wff of ZFC.
Gödel’s method was to introduce the notion k of ‘class’ where: every set was to
constitute a special kind of class; {<x, y>: B(x, y)} would moreover always be a class,
though not necessarily a set; so the above scheme could be replaced by the single
sentence:
("u, B) [("x, y, z) (((<x, y> Î B) Ù (<x, z> Î B)) ® (y = z)) ®
® ($v)("y) ((y Î v) « ($x Î u) (<x, y> Î B))]
where lower-case variables range over sets, and capital letters over classes.
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[IV] Note that in B(x, y) only sets are quantified over. In order to guarantee that
the extension, in x and y, of every B(x, y) is a class, Gödel had to start by postulating
that the extension of every atomic wff is a class. He had then to insure that the basic
logical operations [negation, conjunction and existential quantification over sets] lead
from classes to classes. The formation rules of the formulas of ZFC were conse-
quently mirrored in Gödel’s axiom system.
[V] My main problem was to extend Gödel’s finite axiomatisation methods in or-
der to cover the kind of mathematics used in more comprehensive systems; these
have a richer ontology which normally includes Urelemente, i.e. entities which are non-
classes. Furthermore: over and above the predicates k and Î, other primitive notions
have to be considered, e.g. those represented by T1, … , Tm  and  Q1, … , Qn. Let ‘ele-
ment’ stand for: set or Urelement.
T1, … , Tm  will be construed as classes of tuples, which enables us to bring set
theory to bear on all theoretical entities. Thus, for each Tj, an individual name aj can
be introduced, where: aj denotes the class of all pj-tuples of elements satisfying Tj, pj
being the number of argument-places of Tj. As for the observational predicates Q1,
… , Qn, since they are not to be quantified over, they ought to be regarded as primitive
[For otherwise, a basic statement like Q(d ) would have to be interpreted as (d Î Q); Q
however represents an observational concept, while Î is a theoretical notion which
must be quantified over in the Ramsey-sentence. There would be no basic statements
free from theoretical predicates, which is a highly undesirable consequence].
[VI] Let a, b, g be any (primitive) individual names. Having formulated the usual
axioms of set theory (using class language), the next step is to make sure that all the
atomic wff’s are extensional; i.e. that when considered as propositional functions in
some, or in all of their element variables, the following formulas have classes as exten-
sions:
(x = y); (x = x); (x = a); k(x); (x Î y); (x Î x); (x Î a); (a Î x) and
Qm (t1, … , tp) for each m = 1, … , n; where every ti is either a name or a variable.
[VII] We also have to require: corresponding to negation, that every class pos-
sesses a complement; corresponding to conjunction, that any 2 classes possess an in-
tersection and, corresponding to the existential quantifier, that
("x) [k(x) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("z) ((z Î b) « (e(z) Ù ($y) (e(y) Ù (<y, z> Î x)))))]
should hold. (See [13]-[15] below).
[VIII] We also need to insure that n-tuples of elements can be permuted at will.
Gödel showed that in his system only 3 axioms sufficed; where the latter deal with
2- and 3-tuples. These are Axioms [24]-[26] in Appendix 2. I failed however to get by with-
out the introduction of a fourth axiom, namely [27], which refers to 4-tuples. The reason is probably
that Gödel dealt with at most binary relations, whereas I had to consider arbitrary numbers of argu-
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ments. Axiom [27] might of course prove redundant; but this would not affect any of my philosophical
theses.
The main point of the axioms below is to insure that every normal propositional
function, i.e. every formula H which involves quantifications only over element-
variables, has, with respect to its free element-variables, a class as its extension.
Let me now give a more formal treatment of these guidelines.
Appendix 2: The System S
A finite list of axioms will be given for a Gödel-Bernays type of class-theory which
will be part of an arbitrary scientific system G(k, Î, h, Æ, a1, … , am, Q1, … , Qn) hav-
ing Q1, … , Qn as observational predicates. a1, … , am are individual class names for the
extensions of the theoretical predicates T1, … , Tm respectively.
(i) Adopt the Gödel-Bernays finitely axiomatised set theory S with its two basic
notions of class [k(x) º (x is a class)] and class-membership [(x Î y) º (x is a member
of the class y)].
(ii) Extend S by adding to its vocabulary the name Æ and the binary function letter
h. [Æ denotes the empty set; and, for any two (element) terms t1 and t2, h(t1, t2) will de-
note the set whose only elements are t1 and t2].
(iii) For each theoretical term Tj, enter a class name aj where: pj being the number
of argument-places of Tj, aj will denote the class of pj-tuples subsumed by Tj.
Also add a finite number of element names u1, u2, … , us to the basic vocabulary;
the latter will therefore contain a finite number of individual names, namely: Æ, a1, … ,
am, u1, … , us. The primitive predicates Q1, … , Qn will finally be adjoined to our primi-
tive vocabulary.
(iv) Abbreviations
The basic logical connectives will be: ¬ (negation), Ù (conjunction) and $ (existential
quantification). All the other connectives are taken to be mere abbreviations. We shall
sometimes write A Þ B  and  A Û B  for  ð (A ® B)  and  ð (A « B) respectively.
We shall also make use of the following abbreviations:
e(t) =Def  ($y) [t Î y];
s(t) =Def  [e(t) Ù k(t)] =Def  [($y) (t Î y) Ù k(t)]
(Intuitively: e(t) º (t is a set or an Urelement));
{t1, t2} =Def  h(t1, t2);
{t} =Def  {t, t} =Def  h(t, t );
<t > =Def  t ;
<t1, t2> =Def  {{t1, t1},{t1, t2}} =Def  h(h(t1, t1), h(t1, t2));
Ramseyfication and structural realism 25
then, by meta-induction: <t1, t2, … , tq > =Def  <t1,<t2, … , tq >>.
Thus, by Logic alone:  ð [(t1 Î t2) ® e(t1)];  ð [s(t) ® e(t)];  ð [s(t) ® k(t)]. Also:
Un(t) =Def  [k(t) Ù ("x, y, z) ((e(x) Ù e( y) Ù e(z) Ù (<x, z> Î t) Ù
Ù (<y, z> Î t)) ® (x = y)];
where t, t1, t2 are three arbitrary terms. By Logic:  ð [Un(t) ® k(t)] .
(v) Axioms: The (finitely many) mathematical axioms of our system, which will
henceforth be denoted by S, are as follows (note that these axioms are not logically
independent of each other):
[1]  k(ai ); and e(uj )  for all i =1, … , m  &  all j =1, … , s
Thus, by definition,  ð ($y) (uj Î y).
[2]  ("x, y) [(x Î y) ® k( y))]
(This proposition follows from the meaning of ‘class’.)
[3]  ("x, y)[(k(x) Ù k( y) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î x) « (z Î y))) ® (x = y)]
(This the postulate of the extensionality of all classes.)
By (iv):  ð ("x, y) [(k(x) Ù k( y) Ù ("z) ((z Î x) « (z Î y))) ® (x = y)].
[4]  [e(Æ) Ù k(Æ) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® (z Ï Æ))]
(Existence of the empty set.)
By (iv):  ð [e(Æ) Ù k(Æ) Ù ("z) (z Ï Æ)].
[5]  ("x, y) [e({x, y}) Ù k({x, y}) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î {x, y}) « ((z = x) Ú (z = y))))]
(Pairing Axiom.)
Once again, by virtue of (iv):
ð ("x, y) [e({x, y}) Ù k({x, y}) Ù ("z) ((z Î {x, y}) « (e(z) Ù ((z = x) Ú (z = y))))].
By Logic:
ð ("x, y) [e({x, y}) Ù k({x, y}) Ù ("z) ((z Î {x, y}) « ((e(x) Ù (z = x)) Ú (e( y) Ù (z = y))))].
We can in fact dispense with Æ and with h as primitive symbols through replacing
[4] and [5] by the following axioms [4’] and [5’]:
[4’]  ($x) [e(x) Ù k(x) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® (z Ï x))]
I.e.: ($x) [s(x) Ù ("z)(e(z) ® (z Ï x))];
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whence, by (iv):  ð ($x) [s(x) Ù ("z) (z Ï x)].
[5’]  ("x, y)($v) [e(v) Ù k(v) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î v) « ((z = x) Ú (z = y))))]
By (iv):  ð ("x, y)($v) [e(v) Ù k(v) Ù ("z) ((z Î v) « (e(z) Ù ((z = x) Ú (z = y))))].
By Logic:
ð ("x, y)($v) [e(v) Ù k(v) Ù ("z) ((z Î v) « ((e(x) Ù (z = x)) Ú (e( y) Ù (z = y))))].
That is:  ð ("x, y)($v) [s(v) Ù ("z) ((z Î v) « ((e(x) Ù (z = x)) Ú (e( y) Ù (z = y))))].
Thus Æ and h(t1, t2), i.e. {t1, t2}, and hence also <t1, t2>, can be regarded as incom-
plete, and hence eliminable symbols.
[6]  ("x, b) [(e(x) Ù k(x) Ù Un(b) Ù k(b)) ® ($y) (e( y) Ù k( y) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î y) «
« ($v) (e(v) Ù (v Î x) Ù (<z, v> Î b))))]
(Axiom of Replacement.)
That is:
("x, b) [(s(x) Ù Un(b) Ù k(b)) ® ($y) (s( y) Ù ("z)(e(z) ® ((z Î y) «
« ($v) (e(v) Ù (v Î x) Ù (<z, v> Î b))))].
By (iv):
 ð ("x, b) [(s(x) Ù Un(b)) ® ($y) (s( y) Ù ("z) ((z Î y) « (e(z) Ù ($v) (e(v) Ù
Ù (v Î x) Ù (<z, v> Î b))))].
[7]  ("x, b) [(s(x) Ù k(b)) ® ($y) (s(y) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î y) « ((z Î x) Ù (z Î b)))))]
(Axiom of Separation.)
By (iv): ð ("x, b) [(s(x) Ù k(b)) ® ($y) (s( y) Ù ("z) ((z Î y) « ((z Î x) Ù (z Î b))))].
[8]  ("x) [(s(x) Ù ("y Î x) (e( y) ® k( y))) ® ($z) (s(z) Ù ("v) (e(v) ® ((v Î z) «
« ($y) (e( y) Ù (v Î y Î x)))))]
(Axiom of the Union.)
By (iv):
ð ("x) [(s(x) Ù ("y Î x) k( y)) ® ($z) (s(z) Ù ("v) ((v Î z) « ($y) (v Î y Î x)))].
[9]  ("x) [s(x) ® ($y) (s( y) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î y) « (k(z) Ù ("v) ((e(v) Ù (v Î z)) ®
® (v Î x)))))]
(Power Set Axiom.)
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By (iv) and by definition of s(t):
ð ("x) [s(x) ® ($y) (s( y) Ù ("z) ((z Î y) « (s(z) Ù ("v Î z) (v Î x))))].
[10]  ($d) [Un(d) Ù ("x) ((e (x) Ù ($y) (e( y) Ù ( y Î x))) ® ($z) (e(z) Ù (z Î x) Ù (<z, x> Î d))))]
(Strong version of the Axiom of Choice.)
By (iv):
ð ($d) [Un(d) Ù ("x) ((e(x) Ù ($y) (yÎx)) ® ($z) ((z Î x) Ù (<z, x> Î d))))].
[11]  ("b) [($x) (x Î b) ® ($y) ((y Î b) Ù ¬($z Î b) (z Î y))]
(Axiom of Foundation.)
[12] ($x) [s(x) Ù ("y Î x) s( y) Ù ($y Î x)("z) (z Ï y) Ù ("y Î x)($z Î x)("v) ((vÎz) «
« (e(v) Ù ((v Î y) Ú (v = y))))]
(Axiom of Infinity.)
By (iv):
ð ($x) [s(x) Ù ("y Î x) s(y) Ù ($y Î x)("z) (z Ï y) Ù
Ù ("y Î x)($z Î x)("v) ((v Î z) « ((v Î y) Ú (v = y)))).
Now we come to the axioms which ensure the extensional character of the basic
—logical as well as non-logical— notions.
[13]  ("x) [k(x) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("y) ((y Î b) « (e( y) Ù ( y Ï x))))]
(Extensionality of negation, i.e. of ¬.)
[14]  ("x, y) [(k(x) Ù k(y)) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("z) ((z Î b) « ((z Î x) Ù (z Î y))))]
(Extensionality of the conjunction Ù.)
[15]  ("x) [k(x) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("z) ((z Î b) « (e(z) Ù ($y) (e(y) Ù (<y, z> Î x)))))]
(Extensionality of the existential quantifier $.)
[16]  ("x, y) [(k(x) Ù e( y)) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("z) (e(z) ® ((z Î b) « (<z, y> Î x))))]
By (iv):
ð ("x, y) [(k(x) Ù e( y)) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("z) ((z Î b) « (e(z) Ù (<z, y> Î x))))].
[17]  ("x) [k(x) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("y, z) ((e( y) Ù e(z)) ® ((<y, z> Î b) « (z Î x))))]
(Existence of the Cartesian product V ´ x, V being the universal class, i.e. the class of
all elements.)
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[18]  ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x) (e(x) ® (x Î b))]
(This axiom entails the extensionality of e(x) and of (x = x)).
[19]  ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x, y) ((e(x) Ù e( y)) ® ((<x, y> Î b) « (x = y)))]
(Extensionality of the identity (x = y).)
[20]  ($b)[k(b) Ù ("x) (e(x) ® ((x Î b) « (x Î x)))]
(Extensionality of (x Î x).)
By (iv):  ð ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x) ((x Î b) « (x Î x))].
[21]  ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x, y) ((e(x) Ù e( y)) ® ((<x, y> Î b) « (x Î y)))]
(Extensionality of (x Îy).)
[22]  ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x) (e(x) ® ((x Î b) « k(x)))]
(Extensionality of k.)
By (iv):  ð ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x) ((x Î b) « (e(x) Ù k(x)))].
Hence, by definition of s:
ð ($b) [k(b) Ù ("x) ((x Î b) « s(x))]
(Extensionality of s.)
[23] Consider any primitive descriptive predicate R having, say, r argument-places [R
could be one of the observational predicates Q1, … , Qn of our underlying physical
theory].
Choose, and then fix, any (r + 1) distinct variables: b, x1, x2, … , xr. Let t1, t2, … , tr
be any sequence of (not necessarily distinct) symbols chosen from among x1, x2, … ,
xr, Æ, a1, … , am, u1, … , us. [There exist (r + m + s + 1)r distinct sequences having this
property]. For a given sequence t1, t2, … , tr, let q be the number of its (distinct) mem-
bers which are variables, i.e. which figure among x1, x2, … , xr. Hence q £ r.
Let y1, y2, … , yq be any sequence of these variables. [A given sequence t1, t2, … , tr
determines q and consequently q! sequences of the form y1, y2, … , yq]. For every p
such that 0 £ p £ q – 1, postulate:
("y1, y2, … , yp)($b) [k(b) Ù ("yp+1, yp+2, … , yq) ((e( yp+1) Ù e( yp+2) Ù … Ù e( yq)) ®
® ((<yp+1, yp+2, … , yq> Î b) « R(t1, t2, … , tr)))].
(Here we have a finite number NR of formulas, where NR £ (r + m + s + 1)r.r!.r .)
Let us finally go over to the permutation axioms, namely:
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[24]  ("d) [k(d) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("x, y) ((e(x) Ù e( y)) ® ((<x, y> Î d) « (<y, x> Î b)))]
(Axiom of Commutativity.)
[25]  ("d) [k(d) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("x, y, z) ((e(x) Ù e( y) Ù e(z)) ® ((<x, y, z> Î d) «
« (<z, x, y> Î b)))]
[26]  ("d) [k(d) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("x, y, z) ((e(x) Ù e( y) Ù e(z)) ® ((<x, y, z> Î d) «
« (<x, z, y> Î b)))]
[27]  ("d) [k(d) ® ($b) (k(b) Ù ("x, y, z, u) ((e(x) Ù e( y) Ù e(z) Ù e(u)) ® ((<x, y, z, u> Î d) «
« (<x, z, y, u> Î b)))]
We have thus determined a finite number of axioms, whose conjunction will be
denoted by M. M can be added to the empirical postulates of any scientific theory,
thereby yielding the system S mentioned above. S can therefore be put in the form
G(k, Î, h, Æ, a1, … , am, u1, … , us, Q1, … , Qn), whose Ramsey-sentence is:
($k, Î, h)($Æ, a1, …, am, u1, …, us) G(k, Î, h, Æ, a1, … , am, u1 , … , us, Q1, … , Qn).
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